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ABSTRACT: The present paper is aimed at the teachers (to be) of human sciences 
(especially economics) and offers an in-depth commentary and interpretation of Hans-
Georg Gadamer’s view of the concept of question and the activity of questioning. The 
goal of the paper is to circumscribe the conditions of interrogation thus offering the 
teachers (to be) a means of enhancing the didactic efficiency of the learning 
sequences based on questioning.  
KEY WORDS: question and questioning; conditions of questioning; wrong questions; 
rhetoric questions (and the didactic relevance of); blind questions. 
 
 
No matter what textbook of pedagogy or didactics one picks up, one will see 
that, in the methodology section, the part dedicated to the active-participative 
instruments of teaching revolves around the dialogical method.2Of course, this 
is not a pure coincidence; the researchers’ decision to proceed in this manner is 
not at all accidental. If something like this happens this is due to the fact that the 
dialogical method, the succession of crafted questions and answers that bring 
about other questions, constitutes in fact the backdrop of all the other didactic 
tools aimed at the transmission of knowledge and the education by active 
engagement in the process. We recall: the fundamental task of the teacher in a 
sequence of problem-learning is that of guiding the students – without 
intervening directly – in the endeavor of resolution. Which means: asking 
questions. In case study, the teacher’s task is that of leading the students 
towards understanding that, although particular, the example subjected to 
investigation has, as it is said, an exemplary value. Otherwise put, that it allows 
the logical derivation of general laws applicable to the entire class of 
phenomena to which it belongs. If the teacher would not guide the students 
interrogatively and would straightforwardly tell them what to look for in the case 
studied, the active-participative sequence would not be, in fact, active, while the 
recourse to the particular case as basis for learning would actually be 
                                                 
1 The present article is not a research paper per se, although it is based on extensive research 
in preparation for the course and seminar of Observational Practice delivered at the Faculty of 
Economic Sciences, „Babeș-Bolyai” University Cluj-Napoca during the academic years 2009-
2010 &2010-2011. It gathers the notes of the course delivered and is intended as a chapter in a 
textbook that will hopefully reach the students within a year. 
2 Take, for example, Cucoș, Ionescu / Radu, Ionescu, Albulescu / Albulescu. 
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superfluous. Things stand just the same for all the other active-participative 
methods. 
The importance of interrogation though, does not resume itself to the sphere of 
transmission of already constituted knowledge (education). It proves itself to be 
just as much relevant in that of the acquisition of acquisition. In fact, as teaching 
method, the dialogical method or the heuristic conversation is cut after the 
model of Socratic maieutic, the primary means of knowing in Plato’s Academy.  
Beginning with Plato though and up to the 20th century in Martin Heidegger and 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, in some of the key moments of its history, philosophy 
has even defined itself as the “dialogue of the soul with itself”. If we understand 
that in their difference to the hard sciences (such as physics, chemistry, etc. 
based on experimentation), the preeminent task of the human sciences if that of 
thinking3we can easily understand that interrogation plays a central role in their 
endeavors. 
But although there is a radical difference between the hard sciences and the 
human sciences from the point of view of their tasks (experimenting, 
respectively thinking), their relation is not, in any way, one of excusive 
disjunction. Otherwise put, despite the radical difference between 
experimenting and thinking, the knowledge endeavor presupposed by the hard 
sciences does not exclude interrogation. On the contrary, it presupposes it as 
an antecedent condition and require it subsequently. Any experimental 
endeavor starts with a question: Why is this thing behaving as it does? Will it 
always behave in the same way if the conditions remain unchanged? And, on 
the other hand: What does this or that experiment mean? How does it impact 
what we already know? 
Scientists (both those working in the human sciences and those working in the 
human sciences) are usually very careful with their instruments, both the 
technical and the conceptual ones. They often turn their eyes upon them, 
subjecting them to rigorous inspection in order to see whether and in what 
measure they live up to their purpose, whether they should not be bettered or 
even renounced. Think about it, a speck of dust on the lens of a telescope could 
actually lead to the discovery of a new inexistent planet.  
Despite this though, and even if interrogation as a scientific conceptual means 
already has a multi-millennial history, it has been put under the magnifying 
glass of the scientist and theorists quite late. The first explicit reflections in this 
sense appear for the first time in the 20th century. And not even now, when the 
interrogative activity has become explicitly a theme of investigation, it is not 
treated very thoroughly. In the communication sciences for example – the 
inheritors of the old discipline of rhetoric -, questioning is treated most of the 
time solely from a formal point of view. In such contexts we are told what forms 
questions take (closed -  with a given number of possible answers - or open – 
which ask from the person questioned to propose him or herself a number of 
                                                 
3Here „thinking” should be taken in Heiddegger’s sense from What Is Called Thinking?  
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possible answers and, afterwards, to select one on the basis of some grounds), 
afterwards the discussion drifting off towards the manipulative dimension of the 
closed questions and the means at our disposal to escape their traps. But we 
are told nothing about what questions are in themselves or about what does it 
mean to ask a question.  
Precisely because of this, from a didactic perspective, the communication 
sciences are not very helpful to us. As teachers, we are not interested so much 
in how many types of questions there are, but in what are we to do so as to ask 
the right question for arriving at a thoughtful answer, if not to a true/correct one 
and, at the same time, to determine the person asked to look for such answer. 
(Two absolutely different but also absolutely necessary things for the success 
and efficiency of an active-participative didactic sequence based on 
interrogation.) 
In so much as the communication sciences are of no use to us, our last chance 
is to turn our eyes towards philosophy. That philosophy constitutes a chance in 
this sense ought to be clear considering that what it tells us about questions is 
nothing else than a what they are, how they function, what end do they serve 
and what interrogation presupposes. As we know, in the case of simple things 
knowing what they re, their purpose is enough to know how to use it with a 
certain success. 
Questions are such simple things. It is more complicated to go beyond the 
complexities of philosophical language in order to persuade ourselves of this. 
You see, philosophers have the tendency to discuss everything in the most 
complex terms possible. Professional hazard similar to others. The economists 
see the world in numbers and judge it from the point of view of profit.  
In order not to give you headaches, in what follows, I will comment line by line 
and, when the context asks it, word by word some of the most important 
paragraphs on questions philosophy offers us. I am aware that now, after 
preventing you with regard to the complexity of philosophical language and the 
difficulty of understanding it, at least some of you will want to skip the text 
commented altogether, reading only my explanations. I am not condemning you 
for this attitude. On the contrary, I will try to make your life easier noting, on 
columns, the text commented to the left and the explanations I find in order to 
the right. I would like to believe that despite all these warnings (or, better, 
because of them) at least some of you will want to read at least a bit of 
philosophy.  
In Truth and Method4 the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer writes 
about questions: 
 
 
It is essential for a question, for any question 
to have sense. A question has sense though 
not purely and simply when what it says is 
intelligible. We can easily understand what we 
                                                 
4 Gadamer, Henceforth TM. 
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„The essence of the question 
is to have sense. Now sense 
involves a sense of direction. 
Hence the sense of the 
question is the only direction 
from which the answer can be 
given if it is to make sense. A 
question places what is 
questioned in a particular 
perspective. When a question 
arises, it breaks open the 
being of the object, as it 
were.”(356) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
are told by the question: “What is the greatest 
natural number?”, but it does not have a sense 
for there is no such thing as a greatest natural 
number; thus it does not ask anything. A 
question has sense when, through what it 
says, it orients itself and turns our sight 
towards one thing or one state of facts. It is 
important for the question to be aimed at a 
single thing/state of facts and, of course, that 
this thing/state of facts questioned to be well 
determined if we want the answer to be a 
thoughtful one and to correspond to our 
expectations. I believe that each and every 
one of us, at least once in his or her life, in 
primary school, high school or college has 
been asked by a teacher: “What do you know 
about this or that?” And, at the same time, I 
believe that the great majority of us have been 
at pains with withholding the answer “Lots!” 
even though none of us meant any disrespect 
to our teacher. An answer such as this is born 
precisely out of the fact that the question is not 
aimed at one thing or state of facts but many, 
none of which being appropriately determined. 
Moreover, through the fact that a question, any 
question, turns our mind’s eye towards a thing 
or state of facts, the latter comes to be put in a 
perspective. What we take as given (and, thus, 
unimportant and uninteresting), what did not 
catch our attention so far, now appears to us 
unknown and unrecognizable. The things 
closest to us and most familiar become the 
strangest and the farthest to us. We are 
almost never capable of answering a question 
such as: “Why do you keep straighten you 
glasses?” because, as soon as it is uttered, 
our gesture appears to us almost as the 
gesture of another. I know very well why I 
keep straighten my glasses for I feel them 
sliding off of my nose, but in the first moments 
after I am being asked the question this 
reason disappears from my mind because the 
gesture does not seem to be mine.  
This ability questions have to render 
unrecognizable the things best known to us, to 
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„To ask a question means to 
bring into the open. The 
openness of what is in 
question consists in the fact 
that the answer is not settled. 
It must still be undetermined 
awaiting a decisive answer. 
The signifiance of questioning 
consists in revealing the 
questionability of what is 
questioned. It has to be 
brought into this state of 
indeterminacy so that there is 
an equilibrium between pro 
and contra. The sense of 
every question is realized in 
passing through this state of 
indeterminacy, in which it 
becomes an open question.” 
(357) 
transform what is familiar and close in 
something strange testifies for the 
preeminently violent character of interrogation. 
Any question does violence to the things it is 
aimed at. This is the reason why personal 
questions are painful and we are hesitant in 
answering even though we have the answer in 
mind before the question is finished.  
§ 
By putting the thing questioned in a 
perspective, taking it out of the sphere of the 
uninteresting and unimportant known, the 
question “puts it into the open”. What means to 
say: the lack of certainty the question brings 
along with regard to the thing interrogated, the 
uncertainty that what we believed to know is 
as we know it, opens the possibility that what 
we used to know is otherwise than we knew it. 
A question can fulfill its interrogative mission 
and can lead to an answer only through such a 
suspension of the thing questioned between 
the possibility of being as we know it and of 
being otherwise. This suspension is a 
necessary condition, but not a sufficient one 
for the question to be able to lead to an 
answer. The sufficient condition appears only 
if this suspension takes the form of a state of 
equilibrium. Otherwise put, when the thing 
interrogated can be in a way in the same 
measure in which it can be different; when the 
question, through the very way it is formulated, 
does not privilege a possibility of answer over 
the others.  
Not rarely the polls, especially those 
concerned with political matters, are guilty of 
disregarding this condition. The typical 
question asked in such cases is: “Considering 
that the Left Party proposes to raise the taxes, 
whom would you vote for: the Left or the 
Right?” No wonder that most of us do not want 
to give up not even five minutes of their time to 
such polls even though each of us 
understands that to know the political options 
of the population of a country is highly 
important for democracy. In fact, this is the 
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only means whereby our representatives can 
formulate political strategies reflecting the 
nation’s interests.  
§ 
We should be attentive to something though! 
The openness of the thing or state of facts 
aimed at by the question towards the 
possibility of being otherwise than we know it 
cannot be “boundless”, i.e. complete. 
Insomuch as this openness must be 
constituted, as we have already established, 
as a state of equilibrium between the 
possibilities of being in one way or another, 
the openness of the question is bounded by a 
“horizon”. 
The horizon is what encircles us and what 
moves along with us. It describes the sphere 
of the visible and constitutes the backdrop of 
everything that can be seen. At the same time 
though, the horizon is what gives us the sense 
of perspective. If our sight would not be 
bounded by a horizon, the things we see 
would not appear as big or small according to 
their relative distance from us, but as big as 
they are becoming thus impossible to establish 
the distance that separates us from them and 
their relative measures.5 
Because the perspective, the possibility of 
seeing into a perspective the thing aimed at 
through the question is precisely what brings 
about the state of equilibrium between the 
possibility of it being one way or another, it is 
necessary that every question renders 
manifest, through the very way it is formulated, 
its own horizon. A question that does not 
manage to make it manifest is still fated to 
failure. The are many examples in this sense. 
One of them, dear to me, is a question with 
which students are often confronted in 
Economics class after having studied the 
                                                 
5 A beautiful representation of a world in which the sight is not bounded by a horizon is offered 
to us by Seurat in A Sunday on La Grande Jatte. A copy of this painting can be found online at 
http://kingfishers.ednet.ns.ca/art/grade10/images/seurat-sunday_grande_jatte.jpg (Last 
accessed: 01.02.2011).  
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„The openness of a question is 
not boundless. It is limited by 
the horizon of the question. A 
question that lacks this horizon 
is, so to speak, floating. It 
becomes a question only 
when its fluid indeterminacy is 
concretized in a specific „this 
or that.” In other words, a 
question has to be posed. 
Posing a question implies 
openness and also limitation. 
It implies explicit establishing 
of presuppositions, in terms of 
which can be seen what still 
remains open.” (357) 
 
chapter on globalization: “What do you think, is 
globalization a good thing or a bad one?” 
Certainly, this question has a sense – 
globalization is a highly determined concept – 
and, insomuch as the question is asked after 
the chapter has been gone through, this sense 
ought to be familiar to the students. On the 
other hand, through the way in which it is 
formulated our question puts in a state of 
perfect equilibrium the possibility that the thing 
aimed at be in a way or another. It asks 
explicitly: “Is globalization a good thing or a 
bad one?” But our question is deprived of 
horizon. It does not tell us what is the point of 
view from which globalization should be 
judged as good or bad – for the world 
economy as such?, for the corporations?, for 
the employees? All these are so many 
perspectives from which the question can be 
posed, each of them modifying in a radical 
manner the answer it receives.  
 
Now, that we have seen in a, hopefully, more intelligible manner what the 
philosophers have to say about questions, it’s high time we left the commentary 
aside, drew a line and gave way to interpretation. Just as, though what it says, 
every text we might lay our eyes on attracts its commentary, through what 
implies every text calls for its interpretation. And just as there is no text clear 
enough so as to render useless its commentary, in like manner, there is no text 
so deprived of implications as to render its interpretation superfluous.  
A first implication of the text commented above concerns the point of view, the 
perspective out of which the thing or state of facts interrogated is seen or, as it 
is called in the commented text, the “horizon” of the question. It is no accident 
that the German philosopher employs precisely this word in his text. (All 
philosophers measure as carefully as possible their words. In fact, this is one of 
the fundamental conditions of the philosophical endeavor. If you can satisfy it, 
you can aspire at ever doing philosophy – even though not at being a 
philosopher -; if not, it is better to leave such thoughts aside.) For, when 
compared to the term “perspective” or with the expression “point of view” we 
used in our commentary in order to translate in more intelligible terms the things 
discussed in the text, the term “horizon” bears an additional nuance and carries 
with it, in an implicit manner, also another sense. While saying “perspective” or 
“point of view”, “horizon” also says “situation”, sending thus in the most direct 
fashion to the time and place we find ourselves.  
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The alternative interpretation offered to the concept of horizon in terms of 
“situation” brings along an alternative interpretation of the entire third passage 
commented. From this point of view, the idea that any question must have a 
horizon if it is not to “float” means that any question must be anchored in the 
situation in which it appears and that it has to appear in the right situation.  
We have here an alternative interpretation because the appearance in the right 
situation and its strong anchoring in it render superfluous the expression of the 
viewpoint from which the thing subjected to interrogation is approached. That is 
why it is almost always omitted. Nobody asks “What time is it now?”  
The dependence of interrogation on the situation in which it appears is easily 
demonstrated by everyday life. On the streets, in Romania – and everybody 
knows this, even without acknowledging it -, we can expect and are able to 
answer immediately to no more than three questions from the other passers by: 
“What time is it?”, “Do you have a light?”, “Can you tell me where is X (how to 
go to X)?”, sometimes (but, unfortunately, only sometimes) preceded by the 
polite formula “Excuse me…” When we are asked by a passer by any other 
question than these we will find ourselves in difficulty in trying to answer despite 
that the answer searched for can be well known to us. This is what happens 
almost every time we are stopped by advertisers who probing into our 
preferences with regard to one type of products or services or another.  
From what we have said so far we can already draw some didactic teachings. 
For, insomuch as it tells us what is a question, the above text, in fact, inscribes 
the conditions of possibility of any questioning able to lead to a thoughtful 
answer and, on the other hand, prescribes the all the types of interrogative 
simulacra possible (i.e., those types of statements ending in question mark but 
which do not ask anything in fact). 
The first condition of interrogation, deriving from the first passage commented, 
is that a question must be aimed at a well determined thing or state of 
facts. A question aimed at two or more things or states of fact at the same time 
is forced to pass between them, thus missing all of them. That is why, such 
question could rightfully be called wrong question.  
The second condition, deriving from the second passage, is that no question, 
through the way that it is formulated, should anticipate its answer. The 
questions which anticipate their answer are called rhetorical questions. They 
do not put anything in question but purely and simply state what the speaker 
wants the hearer to know.  
And a third condition, deriving from the third passage, is that every question, 
through its formulation, must render manifest the perspective from which 
the thing put in question is viewed. Alternatively, the condition is that every 
question must be asked in the right context. The questions deprived of 
perspective or those which are not well anchored in their context could be 
called blind questions for, in each case, the deficiency resides either in the 
question’s incapacity to render manifest the viewpoint from which the thing or 
Neue Didaktik 2/2010
Of Questions. For Didactic Use
Adrian Costache
107/109
state of facts is approached, or in the incapacity of the person asking the 
question to see that it is inadequate in the situation given.  
 
Wrong questions, rhetorical questions and blind questions– here are the three 
main forms of false interrogative statements bearing the main responsibility for 
the failure of our active-participative didactic endeavors. We should be attentive 
to one thing though - the last one-: this does not mean that these are to be 
avoided at all times and in any context whatsoever. In spite of their surrogate 
nature or, better put, precisely because of it, at least one of these simulacra is 
both indispensable and highly recommended in the didactic endeavors in 
several contexts and moments of the lesson. These are the rhetoric questions.  
A didactic context in which taking recourse to rhetoric questions is not only 
permitted but also recommended is, of course, given by those situations in 
which the flow of the dialog between teacher and students breaks down, the 
latter being incapable to answer the teacher’s questions. In such a case and 
especially if the terms in which the question was put are important for the 
direction in which the dialogue ought to unfold subsequently it is preferable to 
reformulate the question as rhetoric question rather than to replace it with 
another one.  
Another context, less obvious this time, is given by the recapitulative moment at 
the beginning and the end of the class. Two things recommend the use of 
rhetorical questions in such moments. Of course, rhetoric questions do not 
demonstrate either whether what has been previously studied has been learned, 
or how much of what has been discussed in class was retained. But they offer a 
highly efficient and time-wise economical means of marking and drawing the 
students attention towards what is really important in what has been discussed 
in the previous classes or in that which just ended.  
On the other hand, the use of rhetorical questions is recommended during the 
recapitulative moments due to the fact that, insomuch as they contain their 
answer within themselves, they are deprived of the violence peculiar to the act 
of interrogation. Thus they do not induce the students a state of psychic 
discomfort, keeping them their availability to actively engage in the class that is 
about to start.  
 
Now, after all these discussions about questions, the only thing to do is to put 
what we have learned into practice.  
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